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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS R, COBURN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
GIVAN FORD SALES, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
CRAIG D. KEMPTON, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATITEE OF THE CASE 
Givan Ford, Inc., appeals from a jury verdict finding 
it liable as principal for the tortious conduct of Craig 
Kempton. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COUET 
Following the return of jury verdict, the Honorable 
Allen B. Sorensen of the District Court in and for Utah 
County entered a judgment in the amount of $22,000 
against defendant Givan Ford, Inc. The motions made 
by Givan Ford, Inc., for dismissal, for judgment not-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant requests that the verdict and judgment 
against it be set aside and a judgment of no cause of 
action be entered as a matter of law. Alternatively, it 
requests that the case be remitted to the District Court 
of Utah County for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 4, 1970, at the intersection of Fifth 
South and University Avenue in Provo, Utah, a Sun-
beam sports car driven by Craig Kempton was involved 
in a collision with an automobile driven by Dennis Co-
burn. (B. 5, 126). The Sunbeam was owned by 
the appellant, Givan Ford, Inc., who employed Mr. 
Kempton as a lot boy. (E. 130, 215). As an employee 
of Grivan Ford, Mr. Kempton had various duties in-
cluding: starting the cars regularly, keeping them clean, 
changing antifreeze, checking batteries, and running 
errands on the directions of his supervisors. (E. 45, 49, 
215, 216, 228). He had no training or experience as a 
mechanic and had no responsibility for repairing auto-
mobiles. (E. 50). 
It was uncontradicted that Mr. Kempton was not 
qualified nor authorized to test drive the cars (E. 130-
31), that he did not work under the direction of the 
salesmen (E. 131), and that any familiarity with the 
cars came through taking them on errands and starting 
them each morning (E. 46, 47,107). 
2 
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Mr. Kempton had an agreement with some of the 
salesmen that if he brought customers to them, he would 
receive-a finder's fee out of the salesmen's commissions. 
It was uneontraoted that this was an entirely private 
agreement between Mr. Kempton and the salesmen, 
that Givan Ford, Inc., was in now way involved, and 
that Kempton himself had no duties as a salesman. 
(R. 106,107,134,135, 230, 233). 
At the time of the accident Mr. Kempton was not 
engaged in performing any of his duties, and had not 
been given instructions or permission to take the car, 
but was driving the Sunbeam to satisfy his curiosity 
about the car and because he was interested in pur-
chasing it for conversion into a dune buggy. (R. 132, 
133, 135, 215, 217). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF LIABILITY ON THE PART 
OF GIVAN FORD WAS INCOMPETENT AND IMPROP-
ERLY ADMITTED. 
Plaintiff's case against appellant was based solely 
on respondeat superior and he had the burden to prove 
that at the time of the accident, Mr. Kempton was acting 
within the scope of his employment* Sottas v. [Affleck, 
99 Utah 65,102 P.2d 493 (1940). 
For an employee to be acting within the scope of his 
employment, he must be doing acts which further the 
employer's business and which are reasonably incidental 
to his employment. 
f-
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In Carter v. Bessey, 97 Utah 427, 93 P.2d 490, 493 
(1939), the Court stated: 
" T h e question in every case is whether the 
act he was doing was one in prosecution of his 
master 's business and not whether it was done in 
accordance with the master 's instructions." 
Lewis v. Mammoth Mining Co., 33 Utah 273, 93 
Pac. 732, 733 (1908), states: 
" T h e important question is not whether they 
acted in accordance with the instructions given 
them by the defendant, but were they at the time 
of the commission of the alleged negligent acts 
performing a service for the defendant in fur-
therance of its business." 
In its opinion in Burton v. LaDuke, 61 Utah 78, 
210 Pac. 978, 981 (1922), the Court said: 
"These cases support the doctrine that before 
the master may be rightfully charged with the 
negligence of his servant, ordinarily it must be 
shown that the servant was engaged in prose-
cuting the master's business." 
In the present case, the evidence clearly established 
that at the time of the accident Mr. Kempton was doing 
nothing in furtherance of his employer's business or 
which was reasonably incidental to his employment. 
All direct testimony was contrary to plaintiff's posi-
tion. The evidence established that Mr. Kempton was 
only authorized to take cars from the lot in one of the 
following following circumstances: (1) the antifreeze 
in a car needed to be changed, in which case he was 
authorized only to drive the car across the street, (2) 
4 
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to drive to the corner gasoline station for tire repair, 
or (3) upon express instruction, to take a car on an 
errand. Mr. Kempton admitted that he was to take 
instructions only from Ernest Earl, Ed or Larry Givan 
or Dennis Davis. (E. 131). Both Mr. Ear l and Mr. 
Kempton testified in detail concerning the work order 
system for picking up or delivering parts and it was 
without contradiction that no such errand was being 
performed when this accident occurred. Mr. Kempton 
testified that he did not take the car as par t of his em-
ployment, but drove the Sunbeam as a prospective pur-
chaser, interested in using the chassis and running gear 
to construct a dune buggy. (R. 132, 133, 135, 215, 217). 
Unable to adduce any helpful testimony, plaintiff's 
counsel read into the record, over objection, portions 
of Mr. Kempton's deposition taken July 2,1971: 
Q. (By Mr. Jeffs) Now if you will follow 
me on page 31, I asked you which salesman asked 
you about the condition of the specific cars on 
the lot, and you answered: "All of them would. 
If I was around there they would say, they would 
have a customer and they would yell, 'What kind 
of shape is this car in?' I would say, you know, 
I would tell them pretty well. Dennie liked to 
know just exactly. He didn't like to take the 
customer. He would say, 'Does this car run good! 
Does it eat oil or do this? ' And I would tell h im." 
(E. 52 and 53). 
Later on in the trial, the same question arose again. 
T H E COURT: Rule 32(a) (2) says the depo-
sition of a party may be used by an adverse party 
for any purpose. 
5 
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MR. CLEGG: In this ease, your Honor, it's 
our position, and has been, that this witness is 
not adverse to the plaintiff on this issue. He's ad-
verse to this defendant. 
MR. J E F F S : Your Honor, I don't suppose 
it could have been demonstrated more clearly how 
adverse he is than what happened yesterday. 
THE COURT: You called him under Rule 
41, 42, whichever one it is, as regards the plaintiff. 
MR, J E F F S : As an adverse witness. 
THE COURT: Can you call him for that 
purpose as regards the other defendant? 
MR. J E F F S : I think so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let me read two (Rule 32 
(a)(2)) again. You will see what is bothering 
me. The deposition of a party or of anyone who 
at the time of taking the deposition was an offi-
cer, director, or managing agent or a person 
designated under Rule 30(b) (6) or 31(a) to testify 
on behalf of a public or private corporation, 
partnership, association or governmental agency 
which is a party may be used by an adverse party 
for any purpose. 
Now you are not claiming he was a director, 
managing agent or officer, are you? 
MR. J E F F S : No. I do claim he's adverse 
to us, and I do claim that—I may expand on this 
question of impeachment. I am trying to use this 
for impeachment, yes, that, because of the an-
swers he gave me which were not the same as this 
one the other day, and so that there is a twofold 
reason: Not only that he's adverse and I want 
to be able to use his deposition for any purposes, 
but the other one is for impeaching what he was 
saying to us. 
6 
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THE COURT: If this were a two party 
lawsuit there would be no question, would there? 
MR. J E F F S : That is right. I think the rule 
applies whether it's two party or not. I have the 
same problem in trying to show what the truth is. 
THE COURT: (Let me see the deposition, 
young man. Where are we? * * * (R. 11849). 
THE COURT: What is the basis of your 
objection? 
MR, CLEGG: At least two, Tour Honor. 
First of all that the deposition is not being used 
for impeachment, but to put on affirmative testi-
mony, and the basis for taking the deposition in 
a discovery case is much broader than that, so 
one should not be able to make a record one place 
and superimpose it to the court's stenographer at 
this point. 
THE COURT: I agree with you on that. 
MR. CLEGG: Secondly, it's being elicited 
in leading form as against a witness who is not 
^adverse to the ^plaintiff on the issue that the 
plaintiff on the issue that the plaintiff is now 
developing, but is adverse to this defendant, 
Givan Ford Company. 
MR, J E F F S : If I may respond to that, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: If your objection was on the 
grounds it's repetitious I might take a closer 
look at it. 
MR. CLEGG: I will be glad to raise that 
objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: He's already testified to 
this, hasn't he? 
f 
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MR. J E F F S : That is right. He did not give 
this answer. * # # 
T H E COURT: Did he tell you what your 
responsibilities were? 
MR. J E F F S : I have asked him just now, 
but we have not had him answer that previously. 
:-. (R, 119,120). 
3? TF TP 
THE COURT: I am going to let him answer 
that question. I am going to let you ask him 
again about his answers on page 32. I suspect 
the objection may be well taken. 
THE COURT: Proceed, Mr. Jeffs. 
MR. J E F F S : Thank you, Your Honor. 
Q. (By Mr. Jeffs) Now, Mr. Kempton, we 
were talking about what Ernie Ear l told you your 
responsibilities were, and in your deposition you 
said: "All he told me was that I was supposed to 
keep the cars running pretty good and then he 
just gave rne a few things to do. He said, 'We will 
keep you busy. You come and ask me what to do, 
and I will keep you going for a few days, and from 
then on you are on your own.' He said, 'You will 
know what to do by then.' " (R, 122). 
This use of Mr. Kempton's deposition was improper. 
By plaintiff's counsel's own admissions, it was used as 
independent evidence to establish the liability of Givan 
Ford (R. 120, 121). This is clearly demonstrated from 
the record. 
T H E COURT: Well, the scope of the em-
ployment—what are you offering this for! I 
thought this was already in evidence. He's already 
testified to the same thing on page 32. 
8 
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ME. J E F F S : I don't think he's testified to 
the fact that Ernie Earl told him to keep the auto-
mobiles in good condition and running condition, 
and that is what I am offering it for. In other 
words, that his direct supervisor instructed him 
that was part of his job." (R, 121-122). 
Counsel for plaintiff offered the deposition testi-
mony to imply: (1) that Mr. Kempton had duties as a 
test driver or mechanic in keeping the cars running; 
and (2) that somehow through the private agreements 
between Mr. Kempton and various salesmen, he had 
acquired the implied authority to disregard the instruc-
tions of his supervisor and take cars off the lot on his 
own volition. 
This evidence would not have been admissible if 
directly elicited. The questions were not cast to impeach 
but were cast to superimpose discovery evidence (neces-
sarily broad) upon a jury trial. Defendant Givan Ford 
contended and contends that this is an abuse of the de-
position process and is in derogation of the discovery 
rules, and the phrase "by an adverse party for any 
purpose" is necessarily limited to parties adverse on the 
issue developed. 
Rule 32(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
"(1) Any deposition may be used by any party 
for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching 
the testimony of deponent as a witness. 
" (2) The deposition of a party or of anyone who 
at the time of taking the deposition was an offi-
cer, director, or managing agent . . . of a public 
9 
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. . or private corporation, partnership or association 
or governmental agency which is a party may be 
used by an adverse party for any purpose. 
The Court ruled that Mr. Kempton was not an 
officer, director or managing agent of defendant Givan 
Ford, Inc., but ruled that, since he is a named party to 
the lawsuit, his deposition testimony could be used "for 
any purpose." Defendant Givan Ford contends that, on 
the issue of vicarious liability, Mr. Kempton and the 
plaintiff were not adverse to each other but the testi-
mony elicited was offered solely against, and was adverse 
only to, defendant Givan Ford. 
Kule 32(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is 
identical to the Utah rule. Concerning this Rule, a noted 
authority states: 
"Tine deposition of a party may be used for 
any purpose only by an adverse party; and the 
deposition of a party may not be used by anyone 
other than an adverse party for any purpose ex-
cept impeachment of the testimony of the depon-
ent as a witness as provided in Rule 32(a)(1), 
unless the Court finds the existence of one of the 
conditions enumerated in Rule 32(a) (3).£Adverse 
• party7 as used in this Rule is a term of art, and 
means a party whose interest in the case is ad-
verse to that of another party, even though they 
may be both nominally aligned as co-parties." 
4 A Moore, Federal Practice (2d Ed.) 32-16 and 
32-17. 
As pointed out by this authority, the fact that 
parties are named opposite each other in the pleadings 
does not necessarily mean that they are adverse parties 
as to all of the issues raised in the suit. It is well estab-
10 
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lished that parties may be adverse on some issues but not 
on others. In Skornia v. Highway Pavers, Inc., 34 Wis. 
2d 160, 148 N.W.2d 678, 681 (1967), the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court interpreted an adverse party statute as 
follows: 
"The test of who is an adverse party within the 
meaning of sec. 885.14(1), Stats., is not deter-
mined by whether the person is designated a 
plaintiff or a defendant in the pleadings or 
whether he is adverse or not on other issues. In 
the early case of O'Bay v. Meyers (1911), 147 
Wis. 549, 133 N.W. 605, in discussing the problem 
of adverse party under sec. 4068, Stats., we stated 
the true test was 'Are their interests adverse!' 
citing Crowns v. Forest Land Co. (1898), 99 Wis. 
103, 74 N.W. 546. Parties to suit may be adverse 
on one issue and not adverse on another, and thus 
the right to call a party as an adverse witness 
depends upon whether the interests of the witness 
and the party seeking to call him for examination 
are adverse on the subject matter of the examina-
tion." 
In Bauman v. Woodfield, 244 Md. 207, 223 A.2d 
364, 370, (1967)? the Maryland Supreme Court stated: 
• " Rule 413a2 states, in essence, that at the trial 
or upon the hearing of a motion, any part or all 
of a deposition of a party, so far as admissible 
under the rules of evidence, may be used by an 
adverse party for any purpose. 'Adverse party' 
as used in this rule means a party to an action 
on the opposite side of an issue raised by the 
pleadings." (Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted the term "ad-
verse party" in connection with a dead man's statute in 
Maxfield v. Sainsbury, 110 Utah 280,172 P.2d 122 (1946). 
11 
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In its opinion the Court pointed out that in order to 
determine who is an adverse party, it is necessary to 
look past the caption on the pleadings and determine 
what the parties ' interests actually are in connection 
with the issue in question. 
SJcok v. Glendale, 3 Ariz. App. 254, 413 P.2d 585 
(1966) involved a similar issue: whether the deposition 
testimony could be used by one par ty against another 
when the deponent, also a party, was not "adverse" to the 
first on the issue in question. The Court there said: 
"We are called upon to determine whether 
a deposition taken of an adverse party prior to 
trial is admissible under Eule 26 (d)(2) , Eules 
of Civil Procedure, 16 A.E.S., where, prior to 
trial, the said adverse party by reason of an 
adjudication and discharge in bankruptcy no 
longer has a financial interest or possible lia-
bility in the lawsuit. 
* * * "In attempting to show the authority 
of William Barclay to act for and on behalf of 
the co-tenants in negotiating and signing the con-
tract in question with the City of Glendale, the 
plaintiff, City of Grlendale, relied primarily upon 
the deposition of William Barclay concerning the 
existence of a letter which allegedly authorized 
the said William Barclay to enter into and sign 
said contract for and on behalf of the co-tenants." 
At trial, the plaintiff cited a statute identical to 
Eule 32 of the Utah Eules of Civil Procedure and used 
the following argument to convince the trial court to 
allow its use of the co-defendant's deposition. 
12 
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"The plaintiff, City of Grlendale, in offering 
the deposition in evidence recited Rule 26(d)(2), 
and stated as follows: 
"So I think, of course, Mr. William Barclay 
was a party and we are entitled to use this 
deposition. We are an adverse party. He is a 
defendant and as the plaintiff we are entitled 
to use this deposition for any purpose. Of 
course, the purpose in using this is not only 
against Mr. Barclay but also against all the 
defendants." 
Reversing the trial court's decision, the appellate 
court said: 
"In order for AVilliam Barclay's deposition 
to be admissible 'for any purpose,' under this 
rule (26(d) (2)), Barclay must not only be a party 
in the action, but the 'party' introducing the depo-
sition must be adverse to Barclay's position in the 
suit; Young v. Liddington, 50 Wash. 2d 78, 309 
P.2d 761 (1967). At the time the deposition was 
offered in evidence, Barclay was neither inter-
ested nor adverse to the position of the plaintiff: 
* * # 
4
'We are aware that the deposition dis-
covery rules should be accorded a broad and 
liberal treatment. O'Donmell v. Breiminger, D.C., 
9 F.R.D. 245 (1949). But the right to take a 
deposition does not give the party the right to 
introduce the deposition in evidence without fol-
lowing the rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence. 
This is all the more true when, by use of depo-
sitions, the right of cross-examination may be 
restricted and the hearsay rule emasculated. 
"
 i
 This is a deposition offered by an ' adverse 
par ty ' in pursuant of Rule 26(d) (2) but as to the 
appellee, the deponent Brand is an ordinary wit-
13 
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ness. The statements excluded are thus in no 
sense admissions against interest of a party/ " 
Finn v. J. H. Rose Truck Lines, 1 Ariz. App. 27 
at 33,398 P.2d 935 at 941 (1965) 
The Court thus ruled: 
"Further, it is generally agreed that, under 
the facts in this case, while a deposition may be 
admitted against an adverse party, it may not be 
used against co-parties." 
The foregoing authorities make it clear that the 
admission of Mr. Kempton's deposition as evidence 
against Grivan Ford was improper, as the plaintiff and 
Mr. Kempton were not adverse parties on the question 
for which the deposition was used, scope of employment. 
The admission of portions of Mr. Kempton's deposi-
tion as evidence against Grivan Ford under Rule 32 was 
improper for yet another reason. Use of depositions 
under Rule 32(a) is qualified by the phrase, "so far as 
admissible under the rules of evidence." 
It is well established that a deposition is an admis-
sion of the party giving it and that the admissions of a 
defendant are not admissible as evidence against a co-
defendant. 5 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed) sec. 1416 p. 
194 and 4 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) sec. 1076, p. 116. 
4 Wigmore, supra, states: 
"It follows that the statements of one who is 
confessedly a distinct jDerson B do not become 
receivable as admissions against A merely be-
cause B is also a party. In other words, the ad-
14 
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missions of one co-plaintiff or co-defendant are 
not receivable against another, merely by virtue 
"\° his position as a co-party in the litigation." 
See also People v. One 1950 Mercury Sedan; 116 C.A. 
2d 746, 254 P.2d 66, (1953), Hyatt v. Johnson, 204 Or. 
469, 284 P.2d 358 (1.955). 
The following case involved the interpretation of a 
statute similar to Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure: In Ghezzi v. Holly, 22 Mich. App. 157, 177 
N.W.2d 247 (1970), the plaintiff named several doctors 
as defendants in a malpractice suit. Relying on a statute 
similar to Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the trial court allowed the deposition of one co-defendant 
to be used against another co-defendant: 
"The trial court ruled that plaintiff's coun-
sel could use Mulder's deposition for any purpose, 
including its use as substantive proof as against 
defendant Holly." 
In reversing the trial court's decision. - • \ i • s I; * • 11 ma n 
Court stated: 
"Plaintiff also contends that the Mulder depo-
sition was admissible in evidence against Hollv 
by virtue of sub-section (2) of GCR 1963, 302.4. 
That sub-section provides: 
"The deposition of a party * * * may be used 
by an adverse party for any purpose." 
"Plaintiff constructs the following argument. 
Mulder was a party to this litigation; plaintiff 
was an adverse party. Therefore, Mulder's state-
ment concerning causation was admissible for any 
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purpose, i.e., as substantive evidence. Further-
more, Rule 302.4 provides that any part of a depo-
sition may be used against any party who was 
present at the taking of the deposition. Plaintiff 
concludes that, since defendant Holly was present 
when Mulder was deposed, Mulder's statement 
can be used against Holly as substantive evidence. 
We disagree." 
In its opinion the Court pointed out that the rule 
allows only the depositions of adverse parties to be ad-
mitted for "any purpose." It then went on to explain 
why special status is granted to such depositions: 
In Genesee Merchants Bank & Trust Com-
pany v. Payne (1967), 6 Mich. App. 204, 207, 148 
N.W.2d 503, this Court explained the use of de-
position testimony under sub-section (2) of Rule 
302.4 as follows: 
"The difference in the practices allowed in 
paragraphs (2) and (3) of the Rule is based 
on the distinction between the status of the 
deponent as a party capable of making ad-
missions affecting his cause, or the party 
simply as a witness. Wigmore distinguishes 
the status of the deponent as well (5 Wig-
more on Evidence (3d ed), Section 1416, p. 
194): 
"The general rule that the witness must be 
shown unavailable for testifying in court 
does not apply to a party's use of his party 
opponent's deposition * * * for the simple 
reason that every statement of an opponent 
may be used against him as an admission 
without calling him, The opponent's sworn 
statement though called a deposition, is no 
less an admission than any other statement 
of his." (Emphasis supplied.) 
16 
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Sub-section (2), thus construed, is merely a re-
statement of the long recognized rule of evidence 
that statements of a party which are inconsistent 
with his claim in litigation are substantively ad-
missible against that same party. Accord, Com-
munity Counseling Service, Inc. v. Reilly, (4 Cir. 
1963), 317 F.2d 239, 243. See also, 4 Wigmore, 
Evidence (3d ed), Section 1048, p. 2; 4 Moore, 
Federal Practice (2d ed.), Section 26.29, p. 1963. 
"However, it is an equally well established rule 
of evidence that the admissions of one defendant 
are not admissible in evidence against a co-
fendant. 
"By definition, Mulder's statement at deposition 
constituted an admission. That admission, how-
ever, could only be used against Mulder. I t could 
not be employed against defendant Holly. And 
although Mulder was a party at the time the 
deposition was offered in evidence, his statement 
regarding causation was not, thereby, admissible 
against Holly." 
The rule, therefore, was not intended to allow new 
areas of discovery evidence to be superimposed into the 
trial record, but was merely a codification of the long 
established rule of evidence that admissions of an adverse 
party may be used as substantive evidence against him. 
I t was never intended that the rule be used to allow the 
self serving statements of one co-defendant to be used 
to establish the liability of another co-defendant. 
In light of the reasons behind the rule, it seems 
only logical that where deposition statements will have 
no adverse effect on the party making them, they are not 
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admissions and are inadmissible. Wigmore, supra, con-
tinues: 
"But this allowance of the use of a party's 
deposition as an admission presupposes that it is 
the vpnrty-oppanent's; the deposition party's state-
ments offered in his own favor are, of course, not 
admissions. . ." 
In Ghezzi v. Holly, supra, the Miehigan Court, rely-
ing on a provision similar to sub-section (a) of Kule 32 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, stated: 
"An express provision of Rule 302.4 supports 
our conclusion. That provision is as follows: 
"At the trial * * * any part or all of a deposi-
tion, so far as admissible under the rules of evi-
dence, may be used against any party who was 
present or represented at the taking of the depo-
sition. * * V (Emphasis supplied.) 
"Notwithstanding Holly's presence at the taking 
of Mulder's deposition, Mulder's response at depo-
sition to plaintiff's hypothetical question could 
not be used against Holly at trial for the reason 
that, as to Holly, his response was inadmissible 
under the rules of evidence. 
"Two additional reasons lead us to conclude that 
subsection (2) provides no basis for the use of 
Mulder's deposition testimony concerning causa-
tion against defendant Holly. The first is the very 
rationale which forbids use of the admissions of 
one party against a co-party. 
"(O)rdinary fairness would forbid such a 
license; for it would in practice permit a litigant 
to discredit an opponent's claim merely by joining 
any person as the opponent's co-party and then 
employing that person's statements as admis-
sions. I t is plain, therefore, both on principle 
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and In policy, that the statements of a co-party 
(while usable of course against himself) are not 
usable as admissions against co-party." 
"Likewise, were we to accept the construction 
of subsection (2) urged by. plaintiff, we would 
enable a party-plaintiff to discredit his oppon-
ent's claims merely by joining as co-defendant any 
person from whom plaintiff could obtain at de-
position statements contrary to the position of 
. the original defendant. 
In Glen Falls Insurance Co. v. Weiss, 150 N.Y.S. 2d 
685, 688 (1956), the New York Supreme Court stated: 
"For the depositions thus given could not be 
used by the plaintiff as against any of the other 
defendants. They could be used only as proof 
of the plaintiff's case in chief as against the 
specific adverse party examined, or as an admis-
sion against interest against that party, or in 
cross-examination of the party examined in the 
event he appeared as a witness upon the trial. 
A party examined before trial does not (where 
there are other parties defendant) become a 
general witness on all of the facts." 
From the foregoing authorities, it is evident that the 
trial court's admission of the deposition testimony of 
Craig Kempton as evidence against Givan Ford was 
erroneous. Without such evidence there is nothing upon 
which the liability of appellant can be based. I t is clear, 
therefore, iku tiion* was an erroneous admission which 
"probably hml a substantial influence in bringing tlle 
verdict" (Ruk 4. Utah Rules of Evidence) and the trial 
court's decision -II'MI'M bo reversed 
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POINT II. 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS NO IM-
PROPER ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE AND VIEWING THE 
EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE 
RESPONDENT, THE EVIDENCE WAS STILL INSUFFI-
CIENT TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT. 
Even though on appeal the evidence is viewed in 
the light most favorable to the respondent, in order for 
the verdict to stand on appeal, there must be a finding 
that the jury did not speculate and that its decision was 
based on substantial evidence. Anderson v. Nixon, 104 
Utah 262,139 P.2d 216 (1943). 
The liability of Givan Ford was based solely on the 
theory of respondeat superior. In order to prevail under 
such a theory it is necessary that the plaintiff show that 
Mr. Kempton was pursuing his employer's business or 
doing an act reasonably incidental to his employment at 
the time the accident occurred. Saltas v. Affleck, supra. 
A careful examination of the record reveals that 
there was no substantial evidence upon which the jury 
could have made such a finding. 
Craig Kempton and Ernest Ear l were the only 
witnesses whose testimony dealt with the question of the 
scope of Kempton's employment. Their testimony estab-
lished the following uncontradicted facts: 
Kempton was hired as a lot boy (E, 130, 215). His 
main duties were to keep the cars clean and start the cars 
each morning (E. 45, 215). He also was allowed to drive 
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the cars across the street to change their antifreeze and 
was frequently sent on errands. (R. 49, 216, 228). He did 
not have the authority to take a car from the premises 
on his own volition, but could only do so on the express 
directions of his supervisors or pursuant to a written 
work order. (R. 216, 223, 225). It was undisputed that at 
the time of the accident Kempton did not have permission 
to take the car, was not on an errand and was not 
changing antifreeze, but was driving the car for persona] 
reasons. (R. 132, 133, 135, 217, 225). 
To combat this uncontradicted evidence, the plain-
tiff offered no direct evidence showing that Kempton 
acted within the scope of his employment. Only by mak-
ing some unwarranted inferences was he able to get the 
issue before the jury. By bringing out that Kempton had 
been told to "keep the cars running" it was inferred that 
Kempton had the implied authority to drive the cars on 
hiis own volition. (R. 46). However, Kempton and Earl 
both testified that "keep the cars running" meant that 
the cars were to be started and idled regularly and that 
if they wouldn't start, a mechanic was to be notified. 
(R. 106, 221). By demonstrating that Kempton was 
assigned a dealer's license plate it was inferred that he 
was free to take and drive cars on his own initiative. 
(R. 47). It was evident, however, that the plate was to 
be used when cars were taken on errands. (R. 228). 
From the fact that Kempton was occasionally asked 
by salesmen how a particular car ran, it was inferred 
that he had the authority to test drive the cars. (R. 46). 
Kempton, however, admitted that he had no duties as 
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a mechanic or test driver and that his knowledge of 
the cars came through his driving them on errands and 
starting them each morning. (R. 46, 47, 50,107,130, 230)1 
Finally, plaintiff attempted to infer that because 
several salesmen had offered Kempton a finder's fee for 
bringing in customers, he somehow had the authority to 
test drive cars (R. 106, 107). However, Kempton and 
Earl both testified that Kempton had no duties as a 
salesman, that he was not under the direction of the 
salesmen, that he was instructed not to take orders from 
salesmen, that the finder's fee arrangement was entirely 
a private agreement between Kempton and the salesmen, 
and that Givan Ford was in no way involved. (R. 134, 
135, 230, 233). 
In determining whether there was sufficient evidence 
to support the jury's verdict, the reviewing court 
should not look at the evidence supporting the prevailing 
party's case in isolation, but should view it in relation 
to all of the attending circumstances and countervailing 
testimony. In Continental Bank v. Stewart, 4 U.2d 228, 
291 P.2d 890, 892, (1955) the Court stated: 
"Defendant is correct in arguing that even 
though the testimony standing alone might be 
sufficient to support a finding, it must always 
be appraised in the light of all the attendant 
circumstances and countervailing testimony." 
When the plaintiff's evidence in the present case is 
appraised in light of the overwhelming countervailing 
evidence, it is evident that there was not sufficient evi-
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dence to support the jury's verdict, It was so clearly 
established i • y incontroverted evidence that Kempton 
hia) departed from the scope of his employment that tin? 
question should never have been submitted to the .jury. 
The Utah case of Sottas v. Affleck, supra, is prac-
tically indistinguishable on its facts and presented this 
precise evidentiary question. In llial, cast", thu di'iver of 
a grocery delivery truck offered two girls a ride down-
i)wh. Ills manager had previously instructed him 
'," lake no passengers without permission. In doing 
so, he deviated from the prescribed route and neg-
ligently caused an intersection collision which re-
sulted in the death of the plaintiff's son. 
The trial court directed the jury to return a verdict 
in favor of the store owner which resulted in the appeal. 
"Appellant argues that the question M 
whether the agent was within the scope of his 
employment should be submitted to the jury. 
"Here there was a departure from the course 
of the employment and the employer's responsi-
bility for the acts of his employee had ceased. 
When the employee has clearly departed from 
the scope of his employment there is no question 
to be submitted to the jury. Cannon v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 60 Utah 346, 208 P. 519; 
Fowkes v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 46 
Utah 502, 151 P. 53; Wright v. Interrnountain 
Motorcar Co., 53 Utah 176,177 P. 237." 
Not only is the verdict not supported by the evi-
dence, but H
 silso rjr..;iot hi* supported by a presumption 
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of agency arising from the fact that Grivan Ford owned 
the automobile in question. In Saltas v. Affleck, supra, 
the Supreme Court pointed out that in Utah, as con-
trasted with the majority of jurisdictions, there is no 
presumption arising from the mere fact of vehicle 
ownership. See also Galarowicz v. Ward, 119 Utah 611, 
230 P.2d 576 (1951), and Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 
56P.2dl049 (1936). 
The Court ruled correctly that the evidence would 
not justify submission of liability upon the doctrine 
of ratification. Jones v. Mutual Creamery Company, 
81 Utah 223, 17 P.2d 256 (1932). 
CONCLUSION 
Because there was insufficient evidence to support 
the verdict and because the trial court committed pre-
judicial error in admitting Craig Kempton's deposition 
testimony as evidence against appellant, the verdict and 
judgment against appellant should be set aside and a 
judgment of no cause of action should be entered as a 
matter of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN 
and H. JAMES CLEGG 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Givan Ford,Inc. 
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